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LTHOUGH THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE IN ROME for the

establishment of an international criminal court faces many problems,
advocates and scholars of international humanitarian law have good cause for
some heady feelings in looking back at the groundbreaking achievements of the
last few years. 1
With more than twenty individuals in custody, the International Tribunal
for Former Yugoslavia is no longer in danger of running out of defendants.
Under international pressure, Croatia arranged for the surrender of about ten
indicted Croatian nationals and Bosnian Croats to the Hague Tribunal. In
addition, under the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and NATO umbrella, several
indicted persons have been captured manu militari and brought to the Hague,
and several others have surrendered to the Tribunal. Alas, most of the indicted
Bosnian Serbs have yet to be arrested. The principal leaders responsible for the
atrocities are thus still free, but they are forced to hide from international
justice, and the possibility of their arrest remains alive.
The Hague tribunal has issued several important decisions that clarify and
give judicial imprimatur to some rules of international humanitarian law. The
International Tribunal for the prosecution of genocide and other violations of
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international humanitarian law in Rwanda is functioning despite the problems
that have plagued it during its first few years. Many of the principal indictees
involved in the Rwandan genocide have been arrested and are in the
Tribunal's custody. Like the Hague Tribunal, the Arusha Tribunal has
rendered an important decision concerning its jurisdiction and the
competence of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter to establish the tribunaP Furthermore, the Tribunal is trying several
cases and should issue some judgments this year.
The work of both tribunals demonstrates that international investigations
and prosecutions of persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law are possible and credible. No less, the rules of procedure and
evidence each has adopted now form the vital core of an international code of
criminal procedure and evidence. Creating a positive environment for the
creation of a standing international criminal court, which is likely to become a
reality before the end of the twentieth century, these achievements have also
given new vigor to universal jurisdiction and sparked the readiness of States to
prosecute persons accused of serious violations of international humanitarian
law.
Groundbreaking as these institutional developments are, the rapid growth
of the normative principles of international humanitarian law equals them in
significance. International humanitarian law has developed faster since the
beginning of the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia than in the half~century
since the Nuremberg tribunals and the adoption of the Geneva Conventions
for the Protection of Victims of War of 12 August 1949. Appearing in 1964,
Wolfgang Friedmann's important book The Changing Structures oJlntemational
Law noted that international criminal law recognized as crimes only piracy jure
gentium and war crimes.3 Despite the potential for a more expansive vision even
in 1964,4 the criminal aspects of international humanitarian law remained
limited and the prospects for their international enforcement poor as late as the
eve of the atrocities committed in Yugoslavia.
There is of course a synergistic relationship between the statutes of the
international criminal tribunals, the jurisprudence of the Hague Tribunal, the
growth of customary law, its acceptance by States, and their readiness to
prosecute offenders under the principle of universality of jurisdiction. The
1995 T adit appeals decision of the Hague Tribunal no doubt helped in creating
the environment that allowed the United States delegation to the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court to issue,
on 23 March 1998, the statement on non~international armed conflicts that I
cite below.
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The Statute for Yugoslavia confirms that crimes against humanity do not
require a nexus with international wars, while the Statute for Rwanda extends
this conclusion to peacetime situations and criminalizes serious violations of
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II.
Following a position already made known in 1996, the United States
Delegation to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court issued a statement on 23 March 1998, urging
support for the no,nexus approach. In part, this statement declared that:
Contemporary international law makes it clear that no war nexus for crimes
against humanity is required. The United States believes that crimes against
humanity must be deterred in times of peace as well as in times of war and that
the ICC Statute should reflect that principle.

The United States also announced robust pOSitions-confirming its existing
policy-concerning the criminalization of violations of common Article 3 for
non,international armed conflicts, as well as some principles concerning the
conduct of hostilities. The U.S. statement of March 23 thus pronounced that:
The United States strongly believes that serious violations of the elementary
customary norms reflected in common Article 3 should be the centerpiece of the
ICC's subject matter jurisdiction with regard to non, international armed
conflicts. Finally, the United States urges that there should be a section ...
covering other rules regarding the conduct of hostilities in non,international
armed conflicts. It is good international law, and good policy, to make serious
violations of at least some fundamental rules pertaining to the conduct of
hostilities in non-international armed conflicts a part of the ICC jurisdiction.

Statutes of both ad Me tribunals criminalize rape as a crime against humanity. In
its decisions, the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has already made a
significant contribution to the elucidation of some general principles of criminal
law, particularly duress and superior orders,S and will no doubt further clarify the
concept of command responsibility. Among these decisions, I would criticize the
decisions on duress in the Erdemovic case. If, in fact, Erdemovic was faced with a
situation of the absence of any moral choice (i.e., he would have been killed had
he refused to participate in the mass executions, in circumstances in which they
would have proceeded in any event, as the decision of 5 March 1998 confirmed),
I find Judge Cassese's dissent arguing for acquittal, not just mitigation of penalty,
quite compelling. Indeed, a number of judgments under Control Council No. 10
recognized, in principle, the plea of duress. These judgments in effect tempered
the rigidity of the black letter law of the Nuremberg Charter.
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Cassese's utilitarian argument in Erdemovic was that because the massacre
would have proceeded in any event, the defendant's refusal would have
benefitted no one and would have simply added one more victim. In such
circumstances, Cassese argued, the law could not require Erdemovic to forfeit
his life. Judges McDonald and Vohrah's absolutist argument rejected any
balancing of harms and rested on a categorical prohibition. Of course,
McDonald and Vohrah also emphasized the policy arguments for deterring
future offenders. But under thier absolutist doctrine, a Jew forced to assist in
operating the crematoria in T reblinka would have been denied the defense of
duress. Would that be just? Of course, a person's refusal could inspire others to
resist orders to kill, but in ErdemoviC's case such prospects appear utopian.
In the area of substantive humanitarian law, the Hague Tribunal has
advanced the concept of the applicability of the Hague law to
non~international armed conflicts and has made a significant contribution to
an expansive reading of customary law. 6 Even though the jurisprudence of the
Tribunal on grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions has been rather
disappOinting, as I show below, pending appeals still offer some hope for a
change.7
Not the entire jurisprudence of the Hague Tribunal is beyond criticism. I
regret, particularly, the use of Nicaragua's imputability standard to classify the
character of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Relying in this manner on
Nicaragua was inappropriate because that case dealt with a wholly different
question-whether or not the contras, for legal purposes, either constituted an
organ of the United States Government or were acting on its behalf, in which
case their acts could be attributed to the United States for purposes of State
responsibility. As I show in greater detail elsewhere, the nexus between
attribution and the character of the conflict found in T adic was never present
in the International Court of}ustice Nicaragua discussion.8
Another difficulty arises from the Tribunal's interpretation of the grave
breaches provisions. The Appeals Chamber's expansive interpretation that
"laws or customs of war" in Article 3 of the Tribunal's Statute reach
noninternational armed conflicts9 largely avoided the worst possible
consequences. However, the chamber refused to use Article 3 of its Statute
(laws and customs of war) as a conduit to bring in conduct comprising grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions as customary law (grave breaches are the
subject of Article 2 of the Statute; these can be regarded as customary law
whose content parallels the pertinent provisions of these Conventions).
The grave breaches are the principal crimes under the Conventions.
Deprived of the core of international criminal law in cases deemed
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non,international, the Tribunal could only raise the level of actionable
violence to crimes against humanity, and perhaps in the future, genocide. Not
only does this handicap the Tribunal's ability to carry out its mandate, but some
commentators also criticize the resort to such heavy artillery against relatively
minor offenders, however evil.
For those who do not agree that the conflict is an international armed
conflict, another option, proposed by Judge Georges Abi,Saab in his Separate
Opinion, would be for the Tribunal to include grave breaches within the
customary law it recognizes as applicable even to non,international armed
conflicts. 1o In its amicus brief, the U.S. Government stated that persons
covered by common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions could be treated as
persons protected by these Conventions. ll The Tribunal's enlightened vision
of the customary law pertinent to both international and noninternational
armed conflicts certainly could have encompassed grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions. In addition, the authoritative Field Manual (FM) 27,10
of the U.S. Army has recognized these provisions as declaratory of customary
law. 12
The grave breaches provisions describe certain acts as criminal and subject
the offenders to mandatory prosecution or extradition when committed against
protected persons, defined in the Fourth Geneva Convention as those who find
themselves in the hands of a party to the conflict of which they are not
nationals. Enforcing this provision literally in the Yugoslav context, and in
some other conflicts involving the disintegration of a State or political entity
and the resulting struggle between peoples and ethnic groups, especially when
leading to the establishment of new States, would be the height of legalism.
Imagine, for example, that Israelis and Arabs in the area west of the Jordan
River still had Palestinian (Mandate) nationality during the 1947-48 war.
Denying those captured by an adversary in that conflict the status of protected
persons under the Geneva Conventions, had they been in force, because of
their shared nationality would be absurd. In many contemporary conflicts, the
disintegration of States and the establishment of new ones make nationality
too messy a concept on which to base the application of international
humanitarian law.
In light of the protective goals of the Geneva Conventions, I support an
interpretation suggesting that in situations like the one in former Yugoslavia,
where the fighting was pervasive and its history as a single State resulted in one
nationality, the requirement of a different nationality should simply be
construed as referring to persons in the hands of an adversary. Indeed, the
International Committee of the Red Cross's Commentary to Article 4 of the
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Fourth Convention states that the reason for excluding a country's own
nationals from the definition of protected persons was to avoid interfering in a
State's relations with its nationals,13 a concern obviously not relevant to the
circumstances of the Tadic case, in which each ethnic group considered
members of other ethnic groups as foreigners. In interpreting the law, our goal
should be to avoid paralyzing the legal process as much as possible and, in the
case of humanitarian conventions, to enable them to serve their protective
goals.
Clarifying crimes against humanity is one of the Hague Tribunal's most
important contributions. In the T adic appeal, it confirmed that:
lilt is by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes against
humanity do not require a connection to international armed conflict. Indeed, as
the Prosecutor points out, customary international law may not require a
connection between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus, by
requiring that crimes against humanity be committed in either internal or
international armed conflict, the Security Council may have defined the crime in
Article 5 more narrowly than necessary under customary international law.
There is no question, however, that the definition of crimes against humanity
adopted by the Security Council in Article 5 [of the Statute 1comports with the
principle of nul/urn crimen sine lege. 14

Interpreting the Statute's requirement that crimes against humanity be
"directed against any civilian population," the Tribunal held that the crimes
must involve a course of conduct and not one particular act alone. 's However,
it subsequently explained that "as long as there is a link with the widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population, a single act could qualify as a
crime against humanity,,16 and that a person who commits a crime against a
single victim or a small number of victims could be guilty of a crime against
humanityP
The Tadic judgment then reaffirmed that a "single act by a perpetrator taken
within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population entails individual criminal responsibility and an individual
perpetrator need not commit numerous offences to be held liable."'s Although
crimes against humanity can only be committed against a civilian population,
the Tribunal construed the term "civilian population" broadly: "[T]he
presence of those actively involved in the conflict should not prevent the
characterization of a population as civilian and those actively involved in a
resistance movement can qualify as victims of crimes against humanity.,,'9 For
example, civilians or resistance fighters who had laid down their arms were
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considered victims of crimes against humanity in the Vukovar Hospital

Decision.2o
Finally, interpreting the United Nations Secretary,General's report on
Article 5 of the Statute disjunctively, the Tribunal held that the requirement
that acts be directed against a civilian population can be fulfilled if the acts are
either widespread or systematic.21 The United States proposal on the elements
of crimes submitted to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court on 2 April 1998, takes the same approach.22
Significantly, the Tribunal held that a policy to commit crimes against
humanity need not be a formal one, and that it can be inferred from the manner
of the crime. Thus, evidence that "the acts occur on a widespread or systematic
basis that demonstrates a policy to commit those acts, whether formalized or
not,,,23 is sufficient. Even more importantly, the Tribunal held that this policy
to commit crimes against humanity need not be a State policy. Although
crimes against humanity, as crimes of a collective nature, could be committed
only by States during World War il, the Tribunal considered that customary
international law has evolved "to take into account forces which, although not
those of the legitimate government, have de facto control over, or are able to
move freely within, defined territory,,,24 including terrorist groups or
organizations.
However, I find less persuasive the Tribunal's holding that all crimes against
humanity, not only persecution, require discriminatory intent. 15 The Tribunal
recognized that it was departing from customary law, which did not impose
such a discriminatory intent requirement. There was no reason for the
Tribunal to regard the more restrictive report of the UN Secretary,GeneraF6 as
gospel. This decision unnecessarily limits the scope of crimes against humanity,
and a decision to follow the Nuremberg jurisprudence would have been better.
It is important to note that in the U.S. proposal on the elements of offenses for
the International Criminal Court presented to the Preparatory Committee, the
requirement of discrimination is limited to those crimes against humanity that
involve persecutionP It would have been better, I believe, to regard inhumane
acts against a civilian population, such as murder, extermination, enslavement,
or deportation, as crimes against humanity and to require discrimination only
for persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds, as in Nuremberg. I
hasten to add that although I criticize some decisions of the Hague Tribunal on
this point and a few others, I believe that the Tribunal and its Judges,
Prosecutors, and Registrars have been very successful overall. The solid
foundation they have built will now allow the international community to
proceed towards the establishment of a standing international criminal court.
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The Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the International
Criminal Court Z8 has also made significant contributions that confirm and
further accelerate the radical changes taking place in international
humanitarian law. It has given unprecedented attention to the clarification
and drafting of general principles of criminal law, including non,retroactivity,
age of responsibility, statute oflimitations, actus reus, mens rea, mistake of fact
or law, and various grounds for excluding criminal responsibility.
Although considerable uncertainty about the final language defining the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court still remains, the evolving texts suggest that
apart from the crime of aggression, the inclusion of which in the statute is still
unclear, the Court will have inherent jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
The definition of the crime of genocide tracks the definitions contained in the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The
section on war crimes will probably include a significant catalogue of Hague
law-type provisions, and rape will probably be criminalized as a serious violation of
International Humanitarian Law or grave breach, rather than only as a crime
against humanity, which has a higher burden of proof.29
For non,international armed conflicts, the statute of the International
Criminal Court is likely not only to confirm the criminalization of norms stated
in common Article 3 but also to penalize some significant violations of Hague
law-type provisions and rape.30 However, there is still some opposition from a
small number of States to the applicability of such crimes to non,international
armed conflicts. Finally, crimes against humanity will probably encompass the
the pertinent crimes in the Nuremberg Charter and possibly some forms of
arbitrary detention. One of the proposals would include in crimes against
humanity the causing of disappearances.
The scope of crimes under international humanitarian law now emerging
from the work of the Preparatory Committee has three striking aspects. First,
most governments appear ready to accept an expansive conception of
customary international law without much supporting practice. Second, there
is an increasing readiness to recognize that some rules of international
humanitarian law once considered to involve only the responsibility of States
may also be a basis for individual criminal responsibility. There are lessons to be
learned here about the impact of public opinion on the formation of opinio juris
and customary law. These developments will be further reinforced by the
ICRC's study of customary rules of international humanitarian law, now in
progress. It remains to be seen, however, whether the greater openness to
customary law apparent during the various meetings of the Preparatory
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Committee will also be present when the treaty establishing the future
international criminal court is open for signature and ratification. Third,
because of the probable inclusion in the Statute of Common Article 3 and
crimes against humanity, the latter divorced from a war method, we are
witnessing a certain blurring of international humanitarian law with human
rights law, and thus a progressive criminalization of serious violations of human
rights.
Another important development is the growing recognition that the
elevation of many rules of international humanitarian law from the normative
to the criminalized dimension creates a real need for the crimes within the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to be defined with the clarity,
precision, and specificity required for criminal law in accordance with the
principle oflegality (nullum crimen sine lege). The U.S. proposal on the elements
of offenses is a step in that direction.
These developments could not have taken place without the creation of a
powerful new coalition of civil society driving further criminalization of
international humanitarian law. Much like the earlier coalition that stimulated
the development of both a corpus of international human rights law and the
mechanisms involved in its enforcement, this new coalition includes scholars
who promote and develop legal concepts and give them theoretical credibility,
NOO's that provide public and political support and means of pressure, and a
number of enlightened governments that spearhead law~making efforts in the
United Nations.
These institutional and normative developments will, no doubt, generate
further growth of universal jurisdiction. Although the offenses subject to the
jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals should not be conflated with
international offenses subject to national jurisdiction under the universality of
jurisdiction principle, there is a clear synergy between the two, which I have
already mentioned. The broader list of crimes now emerging from the
Preparatory Committee will inevitably impact national laws governing crimes
subject to universal jurisdiction. For this reason, the broader significance of the
International Criminal Court's Statute exceeds its immediate goals.
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